Abstract

This dissertation studies Grosseteste's attempt in his De libero arbitrio to develop a theory of non-temporal modality which severs possibility and changeability. It consists in close philosophical analysis of Grosseteste's views, based on new editions and translations of De libero arbitrio, De scientia Dei, and De veritate propositionis contained in the Appendices. ;After studying the theories of modality proposed by Boethius, Abelard, and twelfth century logic texts, together with the logico-linguistic framework thirteenth century writers drew from them, I examine the basic assumptions and motivations of Grosseteste's discussion: the notions of sentences and dicta, time-variable truth-value, the notion of power, the problem of reconciling divine knowledge and human free will. ;I identify two main modal theories in Grosseteste, one linking possibility with changeability of truth-value and bearing similarities with as well as important differences from the theories of the twelfth century logicians; the other presented as a reaction to this theory and, in particular, to its unusual claim that true sentences about future contingents are necessary. I attempt to make sense of this by a reconstruction of the theory, making use of the notion of dense time. ;I then investigate in detail Grosseteste's theory of the eternal truths, with an eye to its relation to his theories of modality. I show that Grosseteste's sophisticated theory is not a theory of modality; the theory is seen, nonetheless, to highlight obscurities in Grosseteste's account of non-temporal modality. ;The account of non-temporal modality rests on the notion of a dictim's eternal power; these powers are reduced to God's eternal powers. I critically examine Grosseteste's defense of the idea of divine power, highlighting the difficulties he viewed the notion of the actualizability of a power and of its priority to act as posing. His views on these matters are compared with those of Scotus. ;I investigate the theory of non-temporal modality erected on this basis and, in particular, its reduction to divine powers, the adequacy of the strategy, and Grosseteste's use of the theory to solve the problem divine knowledge poses for free will