Metasemantics without semantic intentions

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):991-1019 (2022)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT The most common answers to metasemantic questions regarding context-sensitive expressions appeal primarily to speakers' intentions. Having rejected intentionalism in Lewis [.” Erkenntnis 85: 1527–1555.], this paper takes a non-intentionalist perspective in answering the metasemantic question: how does a context determine the value of context-sensitive expressions? It focuses on the case of gradable adjectives, i.e. expressions like ‘tall’, ‘expensive’, and ‘rich’, which require a contextually determined standard in the unmarked positive form, as in ‘Pia is tall’. I argue that this standard is determined by a salient comparison class, which, when embedded in the relevant facts, provides input into statistical reasoning which outputs a standard in accordance with conversational domain goals.

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Karen S. Lewis
Barnard College

References found in this work

Null. Null - 2016 - Philosophy Study 6 (9).
Context, content, and relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Shifting Sands.Delia Graff - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):45-81.
Zero tolerance for pragmatics.Christopher Gauker - 2008 - Synthese 165 (3):359–371.
Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):93-117.

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