Immodest inductive methods

Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63 (1971)
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Abstract

Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ =0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We should therefore reconsider the assumptions that led to this conclusion: for instance, the measure of accuracy

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Author's Profile

David K. Lewis
PhD: Harvard University; Last affiliation: Princeton University

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References found in this work

The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (106):272-273.
Induction and Hypothesis.S. F. Barker - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):164-166.

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