Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" and Logical Empiricism: A Comparison of Semantically and Epistemologically Generated Philosophies
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley (
1991)
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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the relationship between two traditions within analytic philosophy: the epistemologically-centered philosophy exemplified by C. I. Lewis and other logical empiricists; and the semantically-generated philosophy which derives from certain views of Frege and Russell and which is exemplified in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Logical empiricists generate their views by pursuing concerns with justification and evidence; the early Wittgenstein generates his views by pursuing concerns with the nature of language. I argue, however, that although they develop their views by pursuing wholly different, and perhaps apparently unrelated, initial concerns, the early Wittgenstein and logical empiricists arrive at conflicting, and not merely unrelated, philosophical positions. ;In particular, I argue that solely by accepting certain basic views of the nature of language, each of which either Frege or Russell accepts, Wittgenstein is led in his Tractatus to reject certain views--including views of the issue of scepticism and of the nature of sense-experience--which logical empiricists generate through their concerns with justification. In doing so, I seek not only to clarify the Tractatus as well as logical empiricism, but also to show that accepting either of these positions requires rejecting the other. ;I conclude by arguing that understanding the relationship between the Tractatus and logical empiricism helps to clarify the work of Donald Davidson, a recent philosopher who rejects logical empiricism. As opposed to certain other commentators , I argue that Davidson is best understood as rejecting logical empiricism, not because he somehow rejects traditional philosophy altogether, but rather because he pursues the same sorts of philosophical concerns with the nature of language which preoccupy the early Wittgenstein