Abstract
This paper discusses a number of recent criticisms of ‘theoretical’ accounts of mental state concepts—that is, accounts which take these concepts to derive their meanings from the roles played by mental states in the explanation of behavior: in particular, I evaluate the claim that (insofar as they are ‘third‐personal’ or ‘theoretical’) these concepts cannot individuate mental states that intuitively are distinct, and the claim that they cannot account for what goes on in the ascription of mental states to oneself. I argue (with reference to what may be the originating text of this approach to mental state concepts, Sellars’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’) that, although these criticisms may have some plausibility when directed against theoretical accounts of experiential or qualitative states, they have little plausibility when directed against theoretical accounts of intentional states. In so arguing, moreover, I try to show the shortcomings of various recent ‘first‐person’ or ‘subjectivist’ views.