Ratio 17 (3):294-311 (2004)

Authors
Neil Levy
Macquarie University
Abstract
The self-deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self-deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self-deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self-deceived agents, nor that they possess contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self-deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self-deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors
Keywords Ethics  Mistake  Moral Responsibility  Self-deception  Tradition
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DOI 10.1111/j.0034-0006.2004.00255.x
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Self-Deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Fairness, Self-Deception and Political Obligation.Massimo Renzo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):467-488.

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