- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?
In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 277--292 (1995)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Qualia: Irreducibly subjective but not intrinsic.Edward Feser - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):3-20.
The qualities of qualia.David de Léon - 1997 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):121-138.
Testing robots for qualia.James H. Moor - 1988 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Qualia.Torin Alter - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
68 (#235,492)
6 months
9 (#295,075)
2009-01-28
Downloads
68 (#235,492)
6 months
9 (#295,075)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Introspecting in the 20th century.Maja Spener - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 148-174.
Cortical activity and the explanatory gap.John G. Taylor - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.
Introspective disputes deflated: The case for phenomenal variation.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3165-3194.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7c76586df8-l2pxr uwo