Must reasons be rational?

Philosophy of Science 55 (2):199-217 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those that we ourselves use. I then propose some conditions that are considerably weaker, and argue that they fulfill the descriptive and explanatory requirements of intentional ascription

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Irrational desires.Donald C. Hubin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 230--250.
Prudence and the reasons of rational persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior?Lisa Bortolotti - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375.
Can virtuous actions be both habitual and rational?Bill Pollard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):411-425.
Reasons and psychological causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
258 (#71,689)

6 months
26 (#95,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Janet Levin
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Paradox of Charity.Marcin Lewiński - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (4):403-439.
Action and Rationalization.Samuel Asarnow - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (TBA):758-773.
Siegel on Critical Thinking.Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1989 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (4):483-492.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Minimal Rationality.Christopher Cherniak - 1986 - MIT Press. Edited by Christopher Cherniak.
Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
Radical interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.

View all 13 references / Add more references