Abstract

Frege's views regarding analysis and synomymy have long been the subject of critical discussion. Some commentators, led by Dummett, have argued that Frege was committed to the view that each thought admits of a unique ultimate analysis. However, this interpretation is in apparent conflict with Frege's criterion of synonymy, according to which two sentence express the same thought if one cannot understand them without regarding them as having the same truth–value. In a recent article in this journal, Drai attempts to reconcile Frege's criterion of synonymy with unique ultimate analysis by holding that, for Frege, if two sentences satisfy the criterion without being intensionally isomorphic, at most one of them is a privileged representation of the thought expressed. I argue that this proposal fails, because it conflicts not only with Frege's views of abstraction principles but also with slingshot arguments (including one presented by Drai herself) that accurately reflect Frege's commitment to the view that sentences alike in truth–value have the same Bedeutung. While Drai helpfully connects Frege's views of abstraction principles with such slingshot arguments, this connection cannot become fully clear until we recognise that Frege rejects unique ultimate analysis.