Note on Absolute Provability and Cantorian Comprehension

Abstract

We will explicate Cantor’s principle of set existence using the Gödelian intensional notion of absolute provability and John Burgess’ plural logical concept of set formation. From this Cantorian Comprehension principle we will derive a conditional result about the question whether there are any absolutely unprovable mathematical truths. Finally, we will discuss the philosophical significance of the conditional result.

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Holger Leuz
Universität Regensburg

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