How Do We Embody Intentionality?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):36-44 (2002)
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Abstract

The enactive view states that mental processes are embodied in the sensorimotor activity of the organism. This paper seeks to show how it is possible to be conscious of intentions in an embodied way, by adding detail about muscle spindle action to a theory put forward by Damasio. Consciousness is here understood as the awareness of our intentionality. This is a motor plan to interact with the environment, and is expressed in the body. As the body prepares the muscles to act, there is propioceptive feedback from the spindles. The muscle spindle system needs to be added to Damasio's body loop to clarify how intentionality is embodied. He feels that core consciousness is based on the proto-self. I believe that the muscle spindle feedback is part of the proto-self, and enables the proto-self to sense the body's motor preparation.

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Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps.Ralph D. Ellis - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):173-198.
Methods for measuring conscious and automatic memory: A brief review.Dawn M. McBride - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):198-215.

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