Abstract
Peter Winch prefaced The Idea of A Social Science with the above quotation adumbrating his thesis that the rules endowing actions with their sense are, like all rules, relative to a social context. A good example, no less illustrative for being imaginary, is Wittgenstein’s of a society in which lumber is piled in arbitrarily varying heights and priced according to the area occupied by the base of the piles. When asked why they do not price the lumber according to the amount, the members of this society insist that they do. Precisely what these people are doing in their commercial practice has no sense apart from the rules which define the practice itself. I shall not here directly argue for this idealistic approach to behavior, but instead exploit it to make three related points. 1) The literature discussing the extensional equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism over the past two decades has taken a different approach, one which is more congenial with realism. The result, in my view, is that this literature has contested the issue using a conception of an act which is inapplicable to rule utilitarian theories. 2) With the more appropriate idealistic conception of an act, rule utilitarianism clearly emerges as inequivalent to act utilitarianism, for they are seen to be theories about different kinds of events. When a rule utilitarian asks, what if everyone did the same, he is asking about the consequences of something which differs more than just numerically from what brings about the consequences of interest to an act utilitarian. Indeed, he must be asking about acts as we ordinarily conceive them, whereas the act utilitarian must be asking about something else. 3) Though it appeals to the consequences of the universal practice of acts so conceived, rule utilitarianism is nonetheless the deontological theory it was intended to be. This is important because, as it will be seen, its prescriptions are thus more practicable than those of the teleological act utilitarianism.