Ethics Without Errors

Ratio 26 (4):391-409 (2013)
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Abstract

I argue against the claim that we should adopt a moral error theory. The intelligibility of our moral practice need offer no questionable metaphysical hostages to fortune. The two most credible policy recommendations that might follow from moral error theory, abolitionism and prescriptive fictionalism, are not very credible

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James Lenman
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.
Hypocrisy and Moral Authority.Jessica Isserow & Colin Klein - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):191-222.
Reinventing Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (4).
Gibbardian Humility: Moral Fallibility and Moral Smugness.James Lenman - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):235-245.
Moral Fictionalism and Misleading Analogies.François Jaquet - 2024 - In Richard Joyce & Stuart Brock (eds.), Moral Fictionalism and Religious Fictionalism. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

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