Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1083-1103 (2019)

Mary Leng
University of York
Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.
Keywords Hume’s principle   evolutionary debunking   metaethics   supervenience  Mathematics
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2019.1584936
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References found in this work BETA

A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Dan Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
The Ethics–Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).

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