Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):329-349 (2001)

Abstract
This paper proposes an exploration of the methodology of utility functions that distinguishes interpretation from representation. While representation univocally assigns numbers to the entities of the domain of utility functions, interpretation relates these entities with empirically observable objects of choice. This allows us to make explicit the standard interpretation of utility functions which assumes that two objects have the same utility if and only if the individual is indifferent among them. We explore the underlying assumptions of such an hypothesis and propose a non-standard interpretation according to which objects of choice have a well-defined utility although individuals may vary in the way they treat these objects in a specific context. We provide examples of such a methodological approach that may explain some reversal of preferences and suggest possible mathematical formulations for further research
Keywords Utility  representation  interpretation  preference reversal
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1015563228687
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,177
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 17:1-68.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Utility and Framing.Paul Weirich - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):83 - 103.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Must Rational Intentions Maximize Utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.
A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling.Marc Le Menestrel - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (3):249-262.
Utility, Informativity and Protocols.Robert van Rooy - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):389-419.
Social Norms or Social Preferences?Ken Binmore - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (2):139-157.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-02

Total views
75 ( #152,417 of 2,499,665 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #418,206 of 2,499,665 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes