Studia Humana 9 (3/4):104-119 (2020)

Michał Dobrzański
University of Warsaw
Jens Lemanski
Fernuniversität Hagen
Reism or concretism are the labels for a position in ontology and semantics that is represented by various philosophers. As Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Jan Woleński have shown, there are two dimensions with which the abstract expression of reism can be made concrete: The ontological dimension of reism says that only things exist; the semantic dimension of reism says that all concepts must be reduced to concrete terms in order to be meaningful. In this paper we argue for the following two theses: (1) Arthur Schopenhauer has advocated a reistic philosophy of language which says that all concepts must ultimately be based on concrete intuition in order to be meaningful. (2) In his semantics, Schopenhauer developed a theory of logic diagrams that can be interpreted by modern means in order to concretize the abstract position of reism. Thus we are not only enhancing Jan Woleński’s list of well-known reists, but we are also adding a diagrammatic dimension to concretism, represented by Schopenhauer.
Keywords Philosophy of Language  Logic  Semantics  Logic Diagrams  Reism  Concretism  Abstraction  Arthur Schopenhauer  Lvov-Warsaw School  Jan Wolenski
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DOI 10.2478/sh-2020-0030
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Troubles with (the Concept of) Truth in Mathematics.Roman Murawski - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (4):285-303.

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