The Interdependence of Narrative and Casuistry in Practical Moral Reasoning
Dissertation, Graduate Theological Union (
1998)
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Abstract
Narrative and Casuistry, viewed as interdependent approaches to practical moral reasoning, provide a fruitful alternative to the dominant abstract approaches. By placing Stanley Hauerwas into conversation with Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, I develop an account of casuistry, narrative, and character as inextricably dependent upon each other. ;In chapter two, an examination of the role of description and analogy in the moral life displays them as interdependent skills: we analogize in light of our descriptions and refine these descriptions through analogical comparison. ;In chapter three, I argue that narratives make casuistry intelligible in a manner well-suited to the contingent and presumptive character of casuistry. Narratives also function as necessary complements to theories and provide a context in which we can view theory and practice as inseparable aspects of a tradition. ;In chapter four, MacIntyre's critique of "applied ethics" shows how neither abstract principles nor cases viewed as autonomous can provide an authentic foundation for moral reasoning. Both elements depend upon a larger ordering of social goods for their intelligibility. Moreover, narrative counteracts criticisms of casuistry as intellectually narrow, too conservative, ideologically naive, and relativistic. ;In chapter five, I argue that an ecclesially centered, casuistic reading of Hauerwas provides a fruitful alternative to interpretations consumed with his alleged sectarianism. It shows how casuistry sorts out what our narrative character means in concrete circumstances while also being normed by that character and its narrative display. ;In chapter six, against Richard B. Miller's argument that casuistry and narrative are largely incompatible, I argue that a fuller sense of poetic and rhetorical considerations indicates how casuistry and narrative presuppose rather than oppose one another. I close with a view of casuistry and narrative as intervening to address alleged deficiencies of each other