A Structural Justification of Probabilism: From Partition Invariance to Subjective Probability

Philosophy of Science 88 (2):341-365 (2021)
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Abstract

A new justification of probabilism is developed that pays close attention to the structure of the underlying space of possibilities. Its central assumption is that rational numerical degrees of bel...

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Author's Profile

Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.

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