Abstract

This dissertation is an attempt to elaborate the Heideggerian interpretation of praxis, and to discuss its significance as well as its weakness. Praxis since Aristotle has largely been discussed within the framework of the theoria-praxis problematic, which has resulted in confusing praxis with poiesis, or in reducing the former to the latter. ;Such a confusion or reduction culminated in recent political philosophies--Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, which interpreted praxis primarily as the "purposive-intentional" act of the agent. They commit a "subjectivistic" error by missing a larger, temporal frame in which the subjective meanings of the agent are grounded. ;This makes clear that we may greatly gain by investigating Heidegger's interpretation of praxis in terms of temporality. Heidegger understands praxis not simply in light of theoria, but primarily in light of poiesis. Praxis, in contrast to poiesis, is not simply conducted by man, but occurs through Dasein that is the locus of the sense of Being. Insofar as it is temporal, praxis occurs in the temporality of Dasein, i.e. original time, which is fundamentally different from the temporality of ontic everydayness, i.e. ordinary time, in which poiesis is produced. While ordinary time is the clock-time characterized by the continuity of now-moment as "presence," original time is that which stretches ekstatically itself because it ontologically contains not only "presence" but "absence" within itself. ;Performed in the ekstatic temporality of Dasein, praxis is ontologically an-archic. While poiesis is that which can be finished, completed, or accomplished with principle, standard, or arche, praxis is that which is acted on account of itself without predetermination. Praxis is that through which Being discloses itself. Indeterminate openness in that disclosure is the meaning of freedom at which praxis ultimately arrives. What man has to do is to let the revelation of Being be. ;Interpreting praxis in terms of Dasein's temporality, Heidegger provides a proper understanding of praxis in its original meaning. My point is that the Heideggerian interpretation, albeit its weakness, helps us to understand the openness and plurality ontologically embedded in praxis