Morality, Uncertainty

Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):334-358 (2021)
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Abstract

Non-Consequentialist moral theories posit the existence of moral constraints: prohibitions on performing particular kinds of wrongful acts, regardless of the good those acts could produce. Many believe that such theories cannot give satisfactory verdicts about what we morally ought to do when there is some probability that we will violate a moral constraint. In this article, I defend Non-Consequentialist theories from this critique. Using a general choice-theoretic framework, I identify various types of Non-Consequentialism that have otherwise been conflated in the debate. I then prove a number of formal possibility and impossibility results establishing which types of Non-Consequentialism can -- and which cannot -- give us adequate guidance through through a risky world.

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Chad Lee-Stronach
Stanford University

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References found in this work

The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Routledge.
Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Mind 109 (434):373-377.

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