Must a Cause Be Contingently Related to Its Effects?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):289 - 298 (1979)
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Most writers on causation have distinguished causal relations or natural necessities from mere correlations or accidental generalizations. I shall assume that this is a valid distinction. However, a "Dogma" of empiricism has been that natural necessity does not amount to logical necessity and that causes are contingently related to effects. In this paper I shall argue that this Dogma is mistaken.



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Meaning and reference.Hilary Putnam - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):699-711.
The Nature of Necessity.Desmond Paul Henry - 1975 - Philosophical Quarterly 25 (99):178-180.

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