Enkratic Rationality Is Instrumental Rationality

Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):164-183 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is widely agreed that there is a rational requirement, “Enkrasia”, which requires that you intend what you believe you ought to do. This paper argues that Enkrasia is not an independent requirement of practical rationality: it is a special case of the requirement to be instrumentally rational. I argue for this view of Enkrasia through an analysis of an all‐things‐considered belief about what you ought to do. Believing, all‐thing‐considered, that you ought to φ implies being settled on a set of options from which to take an option. I argue that this state of being settled on a set of options cannot be a matter of believing. Rather, it should be understood as intending that you do what you ought to do out of that set. If an all‐things‐considered belief implies such an intention, however, satisfying Enkrasia is a matter of satisfying the requirement to intend a necessary means to an end that you intend [*published with open access]

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,654

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Editorial.Julian Fink - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):422-424.
Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.
Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462.
Enkratic Agency.David Horst - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67.
The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
Enkrasia.John Broome - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):425-436.
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency.John Brunero - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.
Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.
Instrumental desires, instrumental rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):93-109.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-08-10

Downloads
57 (#248,718)

6 months
8 (#155,812)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Wooram Lee
Seoul National University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.

View all 30 references / Add more references