Experiences and their Parts

In Bennett Hill (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press (2014)
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Abstract

I give an account of the difference between "Holistic" and "Atomistic" views of conscious experience. On the Holistic view, we enjoy a unified "field" of awareness, whose parts are mere modifications of the whole, and therefore owe their existence to the whole. There is some tendency to saddle those who reject the Holistic field model with a (perhaps) implausible "building block" view. I distinguish a number of different theses about the parts of an experience that are suggested by the "building block" metaphor, but which can be rejected by those who also reject the holistic field view.

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Geoffrey Lee
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Experiential parts.Philippe Chuard - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology.Martina Fürst - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8): 3259–3289..
The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305.
Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

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