Ethics 126 (1):162-174 (2015)

Mark LeBar
Florida State University
In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal reasons and associated relations of accountability
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DOI 10.1086/682193
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