Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):507-533 (2004)
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Rationalist opponents of Instrumentalism believe that reason can and should play some further role in determining our ends. Instrumentalists deny this: reason can generate only reasons for taking the necessary means to ends established antecedently by conative states. I argue that Instrumentalism cannot make adequate sense of the notion of ends. Instrumentalism requires a non-rational way of identifying ends and ascribing rational force to them, and there appears to be none consistent with Instrumentalism’s commitments. As an alternative I outline what I refer to as an Aristotelian conception of practical reason as a promising way of understanding practical rationality.



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Mark LeBar
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Perfectionist Bads.Gwen Bradford - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):586-604.
A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason.Gal Yehezkel - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):39-57.
Can desires determine ends?Gal Yehezkel - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (8):1064-1077.

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