Constructing Cause in International Relations

Cambridge University Press (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Cause is a problematic concept in social science, as in all fields of knowledge. We organise information in terms of cause and effect to impose order on the world, but this can impede a more sophisticated understanding. In his latest book, Richard Ned Lebow reviews understandings of cause in physics and philosophy and concludes that no formulation is logically defensible and universal in its coverage. This is because cause is not a feature of the world but a cognitive shorthand we use to make sense of it. In practice, causal inference is always rhetorical and must accordingly be judged on grounds of practicality. Lebow offers a new approach - 'inefficient causation' - that is constructivist in its emphasis on the reasons people have for acting as they do, but turns to other approaches to understand the aggregation of their behaviour. This novel approach builds on general understandings and idiosyncratic features of context.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What can we know? How do we know?Richard Ned Lebow - 2007 - In Richard Ned Lebow & Mark Irving Lichbach (eds.), Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics and International Relations. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches.Robert H. Jackson - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Georg Sørensen.
On Effect of Private International Law in Contemporary International Relations.Jian Sun - 2006 - Nankai University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 4:118-125.
Obama’s Pragmatism in International Affairs.Shane J. Ralston - 2011 - Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (2):81-98.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-09-10

Downloads
6 (#1,425,536)

6 months
4 (#818,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references