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Risky Killing and the Ethics of War
Ethics 126 (1):91-117 (2015)
Abstract
Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. Although this principle is widely affirmed, recent military practice and contemporary just war theory have undermined it. This article argues that killing an innocent person is worse the likelier it was, when you acted, that he would be innocent: riskier killings are worse than less risky killings. In war, killing innocent civilians is almost always riskier than killing innocent soldiers. So killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers. Since almost all civilians are innocent in war, and since killing innocent civilians is worse than killing liable soldiers, killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers.Author's Profile
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In connection with a much discussed hypothetical situation, in which a person can prevent the death (or killing) of several innocent people only if she herself kills an innocent person, some have maintained that it is morally better for her not to kill that innocent person, on the ground that it is morally worse to do harm than to allow it. The distinc.Bashshae Haydah - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1).
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Citations of this work
What’s Wrong with Automated Influence.Claire Benn & Seth Lazar - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):125-148.
Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.
In dubious battle: uncertainty and the ethics of killing.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):859-883.
References found in this work
Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect.Warren S. Quinn - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):334-351.
Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
The Moral Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature.Madeleine Hayenhjelm & Jonathan Wolff - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E142.
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