Abstract

This dissertation answers an interpretative question in Wittgenstein scholarship and a conceptual question in philosophy of religion. The interpretative question is: What is the relation of Wittgenstein's discussion of logic, particularly meaning, to his discussion of religious and ethical issues in his early work? In the early work, Wittgenstein already has a notion of meaning that centers on use. According to this notion, the agreement in the way of life, as seen in the behavior of the speaker, and the use of a word in that way of life is a quality called force. The force of a word used in religious and ethical statements, which cannot be verified as it can be when it is used in factual discourse, is its meaning. This notion of force is part and parcel of the relation of the logical discussions to the discussions of religion in Wittgenstein's early writings. ;Philosophers and theologians describe the force of words. What, however, are we to do with words that no longer possess force vis-a-vis modern sensibilities? This is the conceptual question in philosophy of religion. Following Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, I argue that philosophers and theologians are to reconstruct the meanings of these words, if the words are central to the way of life. From my interpretation of Wittgenstein, I offer two guiding principles for this reconstruction. We are to look for the intended purpose of the use of the word and offer a meaning that coheres with that purpose; and we are to consider what effects the usage of the reconstructed meaning will have on everyday living and offer only those that have the power to transform everyday life. A theology thus informed by Wittgenstein is not purely descriptive, but is also evaluative. A theological method so construed moves beyond theory to become an engagement of everyday religious practices