Utilitas 21 (1):100-116 (2009)

Authors
Rob Lawlor
University of Leeds
Abstract
In Alastair Norcross argues that scalar consequentialism is the most plausible form of consequentialism, but his arguments are flawed: he is simply mistaken when he suggests that there is a problem with deriving absolutes like right and wrong from gradable properties such as goodness; he cannot justify his claim that the choice of a threshold will always be arbitrary; and his argument only shows that the consequentialist doesn't care about permissibility. Furthermore, I argue that, although Norcross was right to claim that a scalar theory can be action-guiding (to an extent), he was mistaken to think that ought If anything can be said in favour of scalar consequentialism, it is only that it is the most honest form of consequentialism, because it doesn't pretend to care about permissibility
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820808003385
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,908
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Scalar Consequentialism the Right Way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.
Consequentialism.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In Christian Miller (ed.), Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics. Bloomsbury.
The Rights and Wrongs of Consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):393 - 412.
Should Utilitarianism Be Scalar?Gerald Lang - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (1):80-95.
A Defense of Scalar Utilitarianism.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):283-294.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-02-05

Total views
159 ( #72,353 of 2,497,712 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,720 of 2,497,712 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes