Enough is enough: Pretense and invariance in the semantics of "knows that"

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):211–236 (2005)
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Krista Lawlor
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness.Berislav Marušić - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):60-83.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Literal Meaning.François Récanati - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1983 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry.

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