Abstract

In 1973, Rittel and Webber coined the term ‘wicked problems’, which they viewed as pervasive in the context of social and policy planning.1 Wicked problems have 10 defining characteristics: they are not amenable to definitive formulation; it is not obvious when they have been solved; solutions are not true or false, but good or bad; there is no immediate, or ultimate, test of a solution; every implemented solution is consequential, it leaves traces that cannot be undone; there are no criteria to prove that all potential solutions have been identified and considered; every wicked problem is essentially unique; every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem; a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways and the choice of explanation determines what will count as a solution and the actors are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate.1 One needs only a passing familiarity with the history of HIV prevention research, and with the intellectual traditions of research ethics, to appreciate that the perils and opportunities arising from proposals to conduct research with people who inject drugs in some of the most precarious social and political circumstances around the world and the challenges associated with implementing the findings satisfy Rittel's and Webber's criteria for ‘wicked problems’. HIV prevention research has contributed important new knowledge about the feasibility, efficacy or relative efficacy of various prevention strategies in a variety of contexts around the world. But the pathways and timelines for how this knowledge has contributed to improvements in public health practice and/or the establishment of policies that ensure unfettered access to appropriate healthcare services for PWID are less clear and decidedly non-linear. One account of the transition from trial to policy …