Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968 (2013)

Authors
William Lauinger
Chestnut Hill College
Abstract
Many philosophers with hedonistic sympathies (e.g., Mill, Sidgwick, Sumner, Feldman, Crisp, Heathwood, and Bradley) have claimed that well-being is necessarily experiential. Kagan once claimed something slightly different, saying that, although unexperienced bodily events can directly impact a person’s well-being, it is nonetheless true that any change in a person’s well-being must involve a change in her (i.e., either in her mind or in her body). Kagan elaborated by saying that a person’s well-being cannot float freely of her such that it is affected by events that do not affect her (Kagan 1992, 169–189). These two claims—that well-being is necessarily experiential and that changes in well-being must involve changes in the person—are two different ways of specifying the general intuition that a person’s well-being must be strongly tied to her. This general intuition imposes an adequacy constraint on welfare theorizing: To be adequate, a welfare theory cannot allow that someone can be directly benefited by events that are not strongly tied to her. Call this the strong-tie requirement. The strong-tie requirement is easily satisfied by welfare hedonism, but it poses problems for desire-fulfillment welfare theories and objective-list welfare theories. Though a great deal has been written about desire-fulfillment welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement, not as much has been written about objective-list welfare theories in relation to the strong-tie requirement. This paper argues that objective-list welfare theories can satisfy the strong-tie requirement, though probably only if they take a perfectionist form, as opposed to a brute-list form
Keywords Well-being  Welfare  Welfare hedonism  Objective-list theories  Desire-fulfillment theories  Perfectionism
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9389-9
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1863 - Cleveland: Cambridge University Press.
Natural Law and Natural Rights.John Finnis - 1979 - Oxford University Press.

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