Philosophy of Science 38 (1):35-53 (1971)

Authors
Larry Laudan
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities
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DOI 10.1086/288338
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References found in this work BETA

VI. Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought.L. L. Laudan - 1970 - In John W. Davis & Robert E. Butts (eds.), The Methodological Heritage of Newton. University of Toronto Press. pp. 103-131.
The Nature and Sources of Locke's Views on Hypotheses.Laurens Laudan - 1967 - Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (2):211.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Nineteenth-Century Atomic Debates and the Dilemma of an 'Indifferent Hypothesis'.Mary Jo Nye - 1976 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (3):245.
The Historicity of Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences.Chiara Ambrosio - 2016 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (2).
Pragmatisme, Positivisme Et Vérification : Peirce Critique de Comte.Mathias Girel - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:135-156.
Ernst Mach: His Life, Work, and Influence.Wolfram Swoboda - 1974 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 5 (2):187-201.

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