Kant Yearbook 2 (1):123-146 (2010)

Chong-Fuk Lau
Chinese University of Hong Kong
This paper analyzes Kant’s epistemological reorientation of ontology, explaining in what sense Kant’s complex theory of transcendental idealism and empirical realism should be understood as an ontological realism under the framework of epistemological idealism. The paper shows that Kant’s concept of existence is only applicable to empirical objects in the spatiotemporal causal framework. Accordingly, not only things in themselves, but also epistemic conditions such as the transcendental subject and the faculties of sensibility and understanding cannot be said to exist. They are theoretical constructs in the transcendental discourse to account for the normative conditions of objective cognition and reality.
Keywords Kant  Ontology  Transcendental Idealism
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DOI 10.1515/kantyb-2010-020106
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