Pure and Impure Time Preferences

Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):277-283 (2021)
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Abstract

This paper investigates two assumptions of the exponential discounted utility theory (EDU) to which Callender draws our attention: namely that we can cleanly distinguish pure from impure temporal preferences, and that past discounting can be ignored. Drawing on recent empirical work in this area, we argue that in so far as one might have thought that past-directed preferences are more pure than future ones, then there is evidence that people’s pure preferences (in so far as we can make sense of that notion) show more interpersonal variation than has previously been thought.

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Author Profiles

Andrew James Latham
Aarhus University
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
James Norton
University of Tasmania

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References found in this work

Time and Chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point.Huw Price - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1093-1096.
The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.

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