Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆

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Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):16-27 (2021)
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Abstract

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 16-27, March 2022.

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2022

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10.1111/phib.12244

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Author Profiles

Shawn Xavier Hernandez
University of Pennsylvania
N. G. Laskowski
University of Maryland, College Park

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reasons First.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.

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