Why the Naïve Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematicians’ Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge

Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):401-404 (2016)
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Abstract

The view that a mathematical proof is a sketch of or recipe for a formal derivation requires the proof to function as an argument that there is a suitable derivation. This is a mathematical conclusion, and to avoid a regress we require some other account of how the proof can establish it.

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Brendan Larvor
University of Hertfordshire

References found in this work

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Proofs and Refutations.Imre Lakatos - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):474-478.
Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
Proofs and refutations (II).Imre Lakatos - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (54):120-139.

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