Abstract

In recent literature on personal identity, Non-Reductionism has been associated with a variety of other doctrines about personal identity, most notably, with the Determinacy Thesis and with a view of persons as 'separately existing entities.' In this dissertation, I argue that the Non-Reductionist need not hold either of these two positions as is generally thought. I further argue that Reductionist accounts of personal identity are inadequate. The starting point of this project, however, is a proper characterization of the debate between the Reductionist and the Non-Reductionist about personal identity. ;In Chapter I, I argue that Parfit's characterization of the debate is problematic because it overlooks important differences both among Reductionists and among Non-Reductionists. I argue that Parfit has conflated four possible positions into two, and I then identify at least four distinct possible positions with respect to persons and personal identity: Non-Reductive Realism, Reductive Realism, Reductive Anti-Realism, and Non-Reductive Anti-Realism. I then show that Parfit's position is that of the Reductive Anti-Realist. I also show that the position Parfit labels "Non-Reductionism" is really that of the Non-Reductive Realist and that Parfit does not address any other version of Non-Reductionism. ;In Chapters II, III, and IV, I argue that various versions of Reductionism fail. In Chapter II, I address Parfit's Reductive Anti-Realism as it is expressed in his Combined Spectrum argument. I show that the Non-Reductionist can respond to Parfit's Combined Spectrum without invoking either the Determinacy Thesis or the claim that persons are separately existing entities. In Chapters III and IV, I focus on two versions of Reductive Realism. In Chapter III, I address the Causal Continuity version of Psychological Reductionism. There I argue that the Reductionist cannot appeal to causality as he wishes to do, for these causal accounts are ultimately circular. In Chapter IV, I focus on the attempt to salvage the Psychological Continuity version of Reductionism through the introduction of quasi-memories. I argue that, first, this attempt fails to avoid circularity, and, furthermore, it requires an unjustifiable reworking of our concept of a person