Cognition Made Neat and Tidy

Constructivist Foundations 9 (2):269-271 (2014)
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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: This comment deals primarily with Quale’s attempt to distinguish between cognitive knowledge and non-cognitive knowledge. Considering that he uses this distinction as a basis for discussing ethical issues, I thought it important to assess the validity of this position and its potential usefulness for radical constructivism. In the following section, I sketch out my understanding of von Glasersfeld’s conception of cognition; so doing, I set the stage for throwing into question, in the second section, a suspension that Quale proposes regarding both cognition and communication

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