A defense of reasonable pluralism in economics

Journal of Economic Methodology 29 (4):294-308 (2022)
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Abstract

This article aims to defend a novel account of pluralism in economics. First, it argues that what justifies pluralism is its epistemological benefits. Second, it acknowledges that pluralism has limits, and defends reasonable pluralism, or the view that we should only accept those theories and methods that can be justified by their communities with reasons that other communities can accept. Clearly, reasonable pluralism is an ideal, which requires economists of different persuasions to respect certain norms of communication while evaluating each other’s theories. The article ends with a discussion of the conditions under which reasonable communication becomes possible.

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Author's Profile

Louis Larue
Aalborg University

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.

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