Why Pains are Mental Objects

Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303 (1995)
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0022362X

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10.2307/2941042

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Harold Langsam
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Pain.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.
Why pains are not mental objects.Guy Douglas - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):127-148.
Sensation Terms.Peter Pagin - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (3):177-199.
Everyday Thinking about Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.

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