Schelling's Concept of Self-Consciousness in his System of Transcendental Idealism

Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 55:165-180 (2013)
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Abstract

Among the central debates within the classical German philosophy after I. Kant is the question of how intentional self-consciousness is possible. In the following discourse, Schelling's concept of self-consciousness in System of Transcendental Idealism will be examined and critically discussed. The central theses are, first of all, that for Schelling self-consciousness is a case of intentional consciousness; secondly, that Schelling develops a performative interpretation of intentional self-consciousness; and thirdly, Schelling fails to completely explain intentional self-consciousness.

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Stefan Lang
Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg

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