Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact

Erkenntnis 54 (2):247-271 (2001)
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2004

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10.1023/a:1005683704853

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Harold Langsam
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Citations of this work

A Renewed Challenge to Anti-criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):165-182.
A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):283-296.
Nothing matters in survival.Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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