Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):378-395 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible to believe P on the basis of reasons that satisfy the counterfactual, and still get things right about P only as a matter of luck. Seeing where this account of conclusive reasons goes wrong points to an important distinction between having conclusive reasons and relying on reasons that are in point of fact conclusive. It also has wider consequences for whether modal principles like sensitivity and safety can rule out the pernicious kind of epistemic luck, or the kind of luck that interferes with knowledge

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Some Inconclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’.Martin Curd - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:293-302.
A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons.Charles B. Cross - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):353-370.
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Moral and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.John Greco - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence.Wayne D. Riggs - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):627-639.
Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.
Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-08-25

Downloads
102 (#171,530)

6 months
13 (#197,285)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tamar Lando
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

View all 27 references / Add more references