Philosophy of Science 71 (2):205-215 (2004)

Marc Lange
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.
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DOI 10.1086/383012
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Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
On the Evidential Import of Unification.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (1):92-114.
The Unity of Science.Jordi Cat - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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