The Role of Disagreement in Pyrrhonian and Cartesian Skepticism
Abstract
Markus Lammenranta’s essay sheds light on at least one of the
reasons for this. Arguing that disagreement plays a key role not only in the
Pyrrhonian but also in the Cartesian skeptical arguments, he contends that
these arguments are intuitively sound and that their intuitiveness cannot be
accounted for unless we assume a dialectical conception of justification. As
we saw, this view maintains that one is justified in holding a belief if and
only if, when appropriately challenged, one is able to defend it by offering
reasons for it. Lammenranta claims that such a conception of justification
should be accepted because it is rooted in our ordinary epistemic practices,
and that most epistemologists fail to appreciate and explain the strength
of disagreement-based skeptical arguments because of their adoption of an
individualistic and nondialectical epistemology.