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Making Quasi-Realists Admit of Fundamental Moral Fallibility
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):294-303 (2020)
Abstract
If the quasi-realist wants to earn the right to talk like a moral realist, he needs to be able to make sense of moral error. A special form of error—fundamental moral error—is often thought to be u...My notes
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Citations of this work
Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.
Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Nicholas Makins - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):580-594.
Metaethical intuitions in lay concepts of normative uncertainty.Maximilian Theisen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
References found in this work
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Mind 94 (374):310-319.
Précis of Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):122-135.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.
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