Nathaniel Culverwell’s Stoic Theory of Common Notions

In C. Giglioni, C. Laursen & L. Simonutti (eds.), Mind, Life, and Time: Philosophy and Its Histories in Honour of Sarah Hutton. Cham: Springer (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This chapter takes a closer look at the doctrine of common notions and universal consent developed by Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–51) in his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, a work based on lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1645–46, but only published posthumously in 1652. I study Culverwell’s doctrine of common notions and universal consent from the perspective of his critical discussion of two contemporary works, namely Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (1637) and Robert Greville’s The Nature of Truth (1640). I argue that, contrary to Wallis who was indeed an Aristotelian who rejected innate ideas entirely, Culverwell adopted a characteristically stoic position, according to which common notions do not directly derive from sense experience, but are innate dispositions common to all which become present to the mind only under the impact of the senses.

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