Revaluing envy and resentment

Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):155 – 158 (2002)
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Some forms of envy and resentment are centrally connected with a concern for justice and so should not be morally condemned but accepted. Envy and resentment enable us to discern and respond to injustices against ourselves and others. I argue that whereas envy and resentment as character traits or dispositions may be ethically deplorable, as episodic emotions they can be both moral responses to injustice and lead to action against injustice.



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Marguerite La Caze
University of Queensland

Citations of this work

On the very idea of "negative emotions".Kristjan Kristjansson - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.
Envy's Non-Innocent Victims.Iskra Fileva - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):1-22.

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