Knowledge and credit

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Internalist virtues and knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge.Jason Baehr - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
379 (#53,600)

6 months
33 (#103,502)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Competence to know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.

View all 87 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 42 references / Add more references